

Emotion regulation therapy: An integrative approach to treatment-resistant anxiety disorders

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Abstract Cognitive-behavioral, psychodynamic, and experiential approaches have historically been characterized by differing definitions of emotions and beliefs concerning their role in psychopathological process and treatment. However, given recent advances in the basic psychological sciences of emotion and emotion regulation, theoretical orientations are converging on similar viewpoints as to the functional role of emotions in conceptualizing and treating of a variety of disorders. One such area where emotions and their regulation may play a significant role is in chronic, complex, and treatment-resistant forms of anxiety disorders such as generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). A review of the historical approaches to emotions in the major theoretical orientations is presented. Following this, a model of emotion disruption and dysregulation is presented as it relates to anxiety disorders and GAD, in particular. Finally, a new treatment for GAD, emotion regulation therapy, aimed at ameliorating dysfunctional affective processes, is described.

Keywords Anxiety disorders · Generalized anxiety disorder · Emotion regulation · Psychotherapy integration

In recent years, there has been an invigorated interest in the role of emotions in both the understanding of psychological disorders and the process of treatment. For a long period, differing viewpoints for what constituted an emotional experience divided many of the major theoretical orientations. Defining what emotion is and what it does has not proved to be a simple task given its common terminological usage

but lack of consensus in operational definition. As a result, for many years, there was little consensus on both definition of emotion and its centrality in clinical psychological phenomenon.

Interestingly, largely due to advances in understanding basic and pathological emotional processes, theoretical orientations have been converging in emphasizing the importance of emotion. As a result, similarities across perspectives have become more apparent as they highlight the functional perspective of emotion in psychotherapy and mental health. A functional perspective states that emotions are adaptive, goal-defining aspects of experience that help aid in decision making concerning movement towards or away from particular actions or plans (e.g., Frijda, 1986). Efran, Lukens, and Lukens (1990) explain that, since emotion serves this function, it is in a continuous but changing state at all times. One may feel “emotional” at a given time but emotion systems are constantly present, responding to environmental and internally generated cues. In addition, the manner in which individuals are able to manage emotional experience to conform adaptively to a given context also appears to be important to mental health (Gross & Munoz, 1995). As such, a number of approaches have incorporated components of emotion regulation into interventions for a variety of psychopathological conditions (e.g., borderline personality disorder; Linehan, 1993).

One such area where emotions and their regulation may play a significant role is in the anxiety disorders. Attention to anxiety disorders has increased exponentially in the past 20 years. A great deal of evidence has demonstrated the utility of current conceptualizations and treatments for disorders such as panic disorder and social anxiety disorder (see Barlow, 2002, for a review). However, for some chronic and complex (e.g., highly comorbid) forms of anxiety disorders,

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difficulties in understanding and treating these conditions remain. For instance, GAD has received less theoretical attention compared to other anxiety disorders (Dugas, 2000) and has been found to have a poorer long-term response to treatment (Borkovec & Ruscio, 2001). Understanding of how emotional experience becomes dysfunctional and engenders dysregulation may aid in furthering both conceptualizations and treatments of complicated anxiety disorders such as GAD.

This paper aims to (1) demonstrate how views regarding emotion have been considered and evolved across the three main theoretical orientations of psychotherapy; (2) present a model for improving understanding of complex anxiety disorders such as GAD through delineating the role of emotion-related deficits; and (3) describe a developing integrative treatment, emotion regulation therapy (ERT), that is influenced by these theoretical traditions, their approaches to affective processes, and basic research on emotion and its regulation for the refractory anxiety disorder, GAD.

Emotion in the major theoretical approaches

The cognitive-behavioral perspective

Cognitive-behavioral conceptualizations have typically underplayed the importance of emotion variables (L. S. Greenberg & Safran, 1987; Samoilov & Goldfried, 2000). In addition, cognitive-behavioral treatments have also been found to be characterized by less emotional activation within sessions (e.g., Goldfried, Castonguay, Hayes, Drodz, & Shapiro, 1997). Skinner considered emotions to be largely inaccessible to observation and control. Skinner (1953) directly attacks the notion of emotion as a causal entity in *Science and Human Behavior* within a chapter on emotion that includes a heading entitled “Emotions are not Causes.” He states “‘emotions’ are excellent examples of the fictional causes to which we commonly attribute behavior” (p. 160). As such, the subjective nature of emotional experience was a troublesome topic of study for early behaviorists, and inquiry into the phenomenon of emotions was clearly disparaged (Pritchard, 1976). Following early behavioral theory, some theorists attempted to combine learning theory with notions of drives that included emotional phenomena (Dollard & Miller, 1950). These positions were often criticized for attempting to incorporate psychoanalytic concepts into a learning framework. However, some behavior theorists did eventually incorporate internal processes into their formulations (e.g., Bandura, 1971). The resulting theories were an attempt to bring the concept of mind back into psychological science such that subjective experience would, once again, become an acceptable object of inquiry.

The “cognitive revolution” in clinical psychology was a response to the rapid growth of information processing research that began in the late 1950’s (e.g., Neisser, 1967). Emotional phenomena were explicitly de-emphasized in cognitive science due to the complexity and subtlety involved in the fuzzy category of emotion (Gardner, 1985). Classical cognitive therapy (e.g., Beck & Emery, 1985) has approached emotion as a byproduct of cognition. Affect is viewed only as an *outcome* of cognitive activity. As a result, emotion is often relegated to dependent variable status in cognitive-behavioral research examining emotional dysfunction (L. S. Greenberg & Safran, 1987).

In classic cognitive-behavioral approaches to the anxiety disorders, anxiety as an emotion was clearly seen as integral to the disorder but rarely was characterized beyond a dysfunctional effect of other phenomena (e.g., behavior or cognitions) and usually characterized only by autonomic or “physiological” components (e.g., rapid heart beat, shortness of breath; Lang, 1985). Early models of emotional processing viewed anxiety in strictly disruptive terms with mental health being defined as the reduction of this emotion (Rachman, 1980). Foa and Kozak (1986), in their seminal article on emotion processing, began to extend the cognitive-behavioral definition of emotions, stating the importance of eliciting emotional arousal and its associated meaning elements while confronting feared stimuli. This viewpoint emphasized the importance of emotional experience but did not explicitly discuss functional aspects of emotion. Rather, emotion was still viewed solely in disruptive terms. Further, other emotions besides anxiety were not considered to be integral to understanding and treating anxiety disorders.

Although some investigators have focused solely on cognitive factors, emotion in cognitive-behavioral theory has recently been increasingly brought to the forefront (Samoilov & Goldfried, 2000). Barlow (2002) has developed a theory of anxiety and mood disorders that is based in emotion theory. He cites a number of empirical investigations that have found that a higher order factor of negative affect is common to anxiety and mood symptomatology (e.g., Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996). Other theorists have now examined anxiety in more complex emotional terms, emphasizing relations between emotions such as fear of anxiety or *anxiety sensitivity* (Taylor, 1999) and, more recently, fear of a number of evocative emotional experiences (e.g., sadness, anger, elation; Williams, Chambless, & Ahrens, 1997).

In addition, a number of recent cognitive and behavioral interventions have begun to emphasize emotional phenomena. Emotion has received the most attention in the acceptance-based behavioral therapies (e.g., Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; Linehan, 1993), which focus on the allowance and acceptance of emotional experiences; even those that are negative or painful. Linehan (1993) was one of the first investigators to incorporate this approach to emotion

168 into a cognitive-behavioral treatment package. The resulting,
169 empirically informed treatment, Dialectical Behavior Ther-
170 apy (DBT) has been widely accepted and is considered a
171 first-line treatment for borderline personality disorder.

172 Mindfulness-based meditation procedures (Kabat-Zinn,
173 1990; also one component of DBT) aid clients in becoming
174 more flexibly and non-judgmentally aware. When “mindful,”
175 one is able to step back, gain perspective and, in the case of
176 emotional allowance, permit feelings to emerge that can pro-
177 vide direction. These techniques have gained a great deal of
178 popularity recently in treating anxiety (Roemer & Orsillo, *in*
179 *press*) and depression (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002),
180 likely because of their compatibility with behavioral models
181 (Orsillo, Roemer, Block-Lerner & Tull, 2004). In addition
182 to DBT and mindfulness approaches, another acceptance-
183 based approach that has gained popularity is Acceptance
184 and Commitment Therapy (ACT) developed by Hayes and
185 colleagues (Hayes et al., 1999), which aims to reduce emo-
186 tional avoidance by facilitating experiential openness. This
187 is largely accomplished through the process of acceptance,
188 which refers to allowance of your internal experience with-
189 out trying to alter or change it. ACT has shown promise as
190 an intervention for anxiety disorders (e.g., Eifert & Forsyth,
191 2005).

192 The psychoanalytic perspective

193 In contrast to the de-emphasis of emotion in cognitive-
194 behavioral traditions, psychoanalytic theories classically
195 have focused centrally on affective variables but have held
196 deterministic beliefs regarding the manner in which emo-
197 tion is experienced and expressed. Emotion, from a classical
198 viewpoint, is experienced as a result of drive and instinc-
199 tual energy forces. Freud viewed emotions in terms of the
200 hydraulic concept of energy that was prevalent during the
201 period in which he wrote (e.g., Freud, 1912/1959). In this
202 view, affect is a product of non-social and non-cognitive
203 instinctual impulses. In the process of classical psychoanal-
204 ysis, the analyzed undergoes a *catharsis*, wherein emotions
205 associated with dammed up instinctual energy are released,
206 allowing the system to return to normal functioning (Efran
207 et al., 1990). Here, emotions are seen as episodic releases
208 of energy rather than consistent aspects of experience. Af-
209 fective experience occurs only as a result of non-conscious
210 instinctual impulses that have little to do with external oc-
211 currences (e.g., relationships) or the person’s perceptions of
212 those occurrences.

213 A number of psychoanalytic theorists have challenged
214 drive theory for its neglect of personal meanings of behav-
215 ior and the importance of interpersonal relatedness, espe-
216 cially within an affective framework (J. R. Greenberg &
217 Mitchell, 1983). In the past fifty years, contemporary psy-
218 choanalytic theory has developed beyond the confines of

219 classical Freudian theory. Jung (1946) may have been one
220 of the first psychoanalysts to discuss cognition and distin-
221 guish between thinking and feeling. He argued that whereas
222 thinking evaluates experience along the dimension of true vs.
223 false, feeling evaluates experience along a dimension of good
224 vs. bad. Bowlby (1969) theorized that emotionally laden re-
225 lationships are mentally represented in “working models”
226 of self and primary attachment figures. These models are
227 cognitive representations of the emotional security of the
228 attachment relationship. Over time, these mental representa-
229 tions lead to expectations about the caregiver’s involvement
230 with the child and resulting reactions from the child. These
231 working models, subsequently, affect the formation of new
232 relationships as the child grows. Positive attachment experi-
233 ences will lead to a rich working model of the effectiveness
234 of relationships for the secure child. As a result, this child
235 will grow to trust others and form effective relationships.

236 Erikson (1950) and Sullivan (1953), in different ways,
237 both viewed emotional phenomena in the social context in
238 which they develop. This position has been expanded by the
239 object relations theorists who are often associated with a di-
240 alectical focus on a relational matrix and its components of
241 the self, other and the self-other vortex (J. R. Greenberg &
242 Mitchell, 1983). Relational theorists such as Fairbairn, Win-
243 nicott, and Klein have written extensively about the devel-
244 opment of the person through one’s interactions with others
245 (for a review, see J. R. Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). It is
246 these interactions that form the need for relatedness. These
247 theorists discuss the importance of the whole individual’s
248 experience including emotional and cognitive phenomena
249 within the relational matrix. Russell (1998, p. 35) states,
250 “thoughts, feelings, and acts all inform one another and re-
251 quire one another. Any feeling represents a press (however
252 slight) towards some action, in other words, a wish. However,
253 it requires thought to be consummated.” Further, contempo-
254 rary psychoanalytic theorists such as Epstein (1994) have
255 argued for the need to incorporate both experiential, emo-
256 tional systems and rational, analytic systems in conceptual-
257 izations of human functioning. Finally, Westen (1998) has
258 presented a comprehensive framework for a psychoanalyti-
259 cally informed research program that stresses the importance
260 of both cognitive and emotional factors and draws from cog-
261 nitive science, neuroscience, and relational theories.

262 From a therapeutic standpoint, models of psychoanalytic
263 intervention have also evolved to address more dynamic
264 models of interpersonal relations and emotional experience.
265 Treatments in these domains are briefer and have more spe-
266 cific targets of intervention. Some treatments in the short-
267 term dynamic psychotherapy (STDP) approach focus on
268 core relational themes that have unfolded from early to later
269 development (Luborsky, 1984), whereas others specifically
270 engage the therapeutic relationship as a microcosm for the
271 client’s patterns of relations (Safran & Muran, 2000). These

brief relational approaches have been applied recently to anxiety disorders with success (Crits-Christoph, Connolly Gibbons, & Crits-Christoph, 2004; Newman, Castonguay, Borkovec, & Molnar, 2004).

Other recent STDP approaches are more explicitly focused on emotional experience both in the context of interpersonal dyadic regulation (Fosha, 2000) and through an intrapersonal focus on defenses against feared emotional experiences or “affect phobias” (McCullough, Kuhn, Andrews, Kaplan, Wolf, & Hurley, 2003). Both approaches are based on the short-term psychodynamic models of Davenloo (1980) and Malan (1976) who pioneered a therapeutic style aimed at aiding clients in addressing defenses against emotional experiences. The approaches of Fosha (2000) and McCullough and colleagues (McCullough et al., 2003) are unique in the psychoanalytic literature for intervening on emotions directly and extend these earlier STDP models by incorporating a more explicit focus on emotions, which are seen as vital, adaptive and motivationally informative. These emotion-focused, STDP approaches draw not only from earlier psychoanalytic thought but also from the experiential tradition, which is reviewed in the next section.

Experiential perspective

Although psychoanalytic and cognitive-behavioral orientations are clearly divergent in a number of respects, both approaches, in their classical forms, originally viewed emotions in similarly dysfunctional terms, an entity needing to be reduced for functionality to occur. In contrast, the experiential approach has historically viewed humans in dynamic, interrelated terms incorporating the importance of emotion in adaptive functioning. *Experiential therapy* is an umbrella-term for modern approaches rooted in humanistic, gestalt, and existential traditions. Following a rise in interest in these orientations in the 1960s and 1970s, mainstream attention to these approaches diminished. However, the emergence of contemporary treatments (e.g., L. S. Greenberg, 2002) has revitalized an interest in these experiential orientations. These treatments are novel as they base their approaches on not only these historical traditions but also on basic research on emotion and affective neuroscience.

L. S. Greenberg and colleagues (L. S. Greenberg & Van Balen, 1998; Watson, Greenberg, & Lietaer, 1998) review the contributions of client-centered, humanistic, gestalt, and existential traditions in the shaping of modern experiential therapy. The role of emotions figures prominently in the original formulations of these orientations. Carl Roger’s client-centered approach was groundbreaking in its primary focus on the phenomenological experience of the client. The ability of the therapist to engage this experience of the client in an empathic, non-judgmental manner and reflect this back to the client was considered by Rogers to be the essential compo-

nent of client-centered therapy. Rogers considered dysfunction to arise from an unwillingness to remain aware of all aspects of experiences, particularly those that have growth potential (Rogers, 1959). Rogers argued that clients grow as a function of their ability to become more aware of their emotional reactions in their experience, become more accepting of them, and increase understanding of their importance in engaging in experiences congruent with their needs.

Gestalt therapy, developed by Fritz Perls (1969), historically has also explicitly focused on emotional processes in its approach to therapeutic change. Central to this orientation is the notion that life experiences are not static but are, rather, evolving continuously. Further, one’s ability to engage this unfolding of experience and create meaning from it is directly related to their ability to function effectively (Watson et al., 1998). In gestalt therapy, exercises are used to generate a focus upon the present moment experience of needs, feelings, sensations and motor behaviors. From this awareness of experience, clients are able to create meaning of this experience, become more active in determining where they would like these experiences to progress towards, and become more tolerant of when these goals are unable to be realized. Insight into what is impeding their ability to gain this awareness and action related to their emotions occurs through a process of discovery rather than interpretation. Rather than discussing challenges to experiencing at an intellectual level, exercises are conducted in which clients enact conflicts in self or dialogues with others with which they have unresolved feelings (Watson et al., 1998).

Inherent in the tradition of existential approaches is the acceptance of emotional experience as an integral aspect of living (e.g., May, 1960). In existential theory, individuals are conflicted with the knowledge of death, isolation, freedom, and meaninglessness (Watson et al., 1998). Health is seen as the ability to accept the anxiety that accompanies the knowledge of these negative forces and to not resort to trying to ignore, suppress, or control this reality of the finitude of experience. Yalom (1980) stresses the importance of immediate affective experience, especially within the therapeutic context, in assisting clients to accept all aspects of experience and to create meaning, even in the face of uncertainty.

Contemporary experiential approaches build upon the foundational views of emotions inherent in client-centered, gestalt, and existential traditions. Gendlin (1996), in his focusing-oriented psychotherapy, has stressed the importance of awareness of the immediate affective experience, especially as it relates to bodily sensations. Gendlin argues that the *felt sense* of bodily sensations provide individuals with a tacit form of knowledge of our reactions to both internal and external events. In this treatment, individuals learn to identify these sensations and gain a better understanding of their implicit meanings. Greenberg (e.g., 2002; this issue) has developed emotion-focused therapy, which he considers

376 a “process-experiential therapy,” since it focuses on the
377 temporal unfolding of an emotional episode and all of its
378 constituent components. Greenberg draws heavily from the
379 empathic tone of client-centered therapy and the experiential
380 exercises of gestalt therapy. The goal of emotion-focused
381 therapy is to bring emotions and their associated motivational
382 elements into active awareness (Watson et al., 1998).

383 L. S. Greenberg and Safran (1987) have distinguished
384 among types of emotion including those that are reflective of
385 core emotional reactions (which he terms *primary emotions*;
386 these can be adaptive or maladaptive), that are reactions to
387 other emotions (which he terms *secondary emotions*; these
388 are largely maladaptive), and that are only evoked strategi-
389 cally to gain a desired outcome (which he terms *instrumental*
390 *emotions*; these are often manipulative). Primary emotional
391 reactions refer to biologically adaptive emotional responses
392 that provide information about action tendencies, associated
393 meanings and motivation for behavior. These responses in-
394 clude what have been termed the “basic emotions” such as
395 fear, joy, anger, and sadness. Adaptive primary emotions are
396 integral to understanding our goals and making decisions
397 and, hence, their exploration is encouraged in Greenberg’s
398 treatment. This is accomplished through acceptance of emo-
399 tional experiences, adaptive utilization of this experience to
400 create meaning, and the transformation of maladaptive emo-
401 tional states to more productive, emotional ones that aid in
402 effective decision making and adaptive action engagement
403 (L. S. Greenberg, 2002; this issue).

404 Although the experiential traditions have incorporated
405 fundamental views of emotions since their inception, many
406 of the historical foundations of the experiential approach
407 were originally empirically untested and unconnected to
408 other literatures on the process of emotion, disorder, and
409 interpersonal relations. However, this has changed consid-
410 erably in contemporary experiential therapy. First, L. S.
411 Greenberg has developed his approach largely from basic
412 findings concerning the functional role of emotions and their
413 neurobiological substrates. Also, L. S. Greenberg and col-
414 leagues have found positive therapeutic outcome for EFT
415 and have demonstrated that depth of experiencing emotions
416 in session is a key factor in treatment success (for a review,
417 see Whelton, 2004). Recently, in line with current trends in
418 emotion research, L. S. Greenberg has begun to stress not
419 only the experience of emotions but also the need for their
420 management and regulation (L. S. Greenberg, 2002; this is-
421 sue). Finally, experiential traditions originally eschewed the
422 concept of disorder. However, recently, experiential thera-
423 pists have delineated their approaches to specific disorder
424 populations such as depression (Pos & Greenberg, 2003)
425 and anxiety disorders (Wolfe & Sigel, 1998), thus increasing
426 ability to determine specificity of different experiential ther-
427 apeutic processes for different forms of psychopathological
428 conditions.

Emotion regulation therapy (ERT) for GAD

Emotion dysregulation model

432 Despite its association with significant impairment and life
433 dissatisfaction, increased health care utilization, increased
434 health care costs and decreased productivity (Kessler, 2004),
435 GAD remains an understudied (Dugas, 2000) and treatment-
436 resistant (Borkovec & Ruscio, 2001) disorder. Cognitive-
437 behavioral treatments for GAD, although efficacious, have
438 not yet demonstrated that clients, following successful psy-
439 chotherapy, have improved to a level of life quality and long-
440 term functioning that is seen in other anxiety disorders.

441 One avenue for improving understanding and treatment
442 of GAD is through delineation of the role of emotion dys-
443 function and dysregulation. Studies in this area, particularly
444 those that have examined the avoidant function of worry (see
445 Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004, for a review) have begun
446 to demonstrate the importance of emotion in the worry pro-
447 cess. However, emotions may play a larger role in GAD than
448 solely in their relationship to worry. In fact, emotion regula-
449 tion deficits contribute to the prediction of GAD beyond the
450 predictive contributions of worry, anxiety, and depression
451 (Mennin et al., in press). My colleagues and I (for an intro-
452 duction to this perspective, see Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, &
453 Fresco, 2002; Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Carmin, 2004)
454 have developed an emotion dysregulation model of GAD.
455 In this model, emotion disruption and dysregulation may be
456 reflected in (1) heightened intensity of emotions; (2) poor
457 understanding of emotions; (3) negative reactivity to one’s
458 emotional state (e.g., fear of emotion); and (4) maladaptive
459 emotional management responses.

460 Preliminary evidence provides support for this emotion
461 dysregulation model in explaining dysfunctional processes
462 in GAD (Mennin et al., in press). We found that individ-
463 uals with GAD rated their emotional experiences as sig-
464 nificantly more intense than other individuals. Consistent
465 with our model, individuals with GAD had more difficulty
466 than control participants identifying, describing, and clar-
467 ifying the motivational content of emotions than controls
468 (Mennin et al., in press; Studies 1 & 2). Further, individuals
469 with GAD who underwent a negative mood induction had
470 more difficulty understanding their reactions to their resul-
471 tant emotional state than controls (Mennin et al., in press;
472 Study 3). Individuals with GAD also reported greater fear of
473 anxiety, sadness, anger, and positive emotions than controls,
474 and fear of sadness and anxiety made unique contributions
475 to the detection of GAD (Mennin et al., in press; Studies 1
476 & 2). The final component of the emotion regulation model
477 of GAD involves maladaptive regulatory responses includ-
478 ing difficulties in managing emotional experiences and the
479 usage of control strategies to avoid emotions. Individuals

with GAD have difficulty soothing themselves following a negative mood. In particular, they demonstrated lower trait (Mennin et al., *in press*; Study 1 & 2) and state levels (following an experimental mood induction; Study 3) of returning negative moods to a euthymic baseline state than controls.

Taken together, these findings suggest that given a high level of emotional intensity and difficulty understanding emotions, individuals with GAD may react negatively to their emotions and have an inability to soothe resulting negative moods and turn to a number of maladaptive methods for managing aversively perceived emotional experiences, including, but not limited to, worry. This emotion regulation perspective builds upon the foundational work of Borkovec and his colleagues in their examination of worry in GAD (for a review, see Borkovec et al., 2004). Individuals with GAD may attempt to regulate their emotions by using worry to ineffectively and inappropriately control or suppress emotional experience. Worry may be viewed as a cognitive control strategy that individuals employ to reduce/control an aversive, uncertain emotional state. Borkovec and colleagues have provided considerable evidence that worry serves such an avoidance function in GAD (Borkovec et al., 2004).

Overview of ERT

ERT addresses the emotionally avoidant characteristics of individuals with GAD within a framework of emotion dysregulation (for a case study using this approach, see Mennin, 2004). This emotion regulation approach to GAD may offer additional strategies to bolster the efficacy of treatments for GAD. If we conceptualize persons with GAD as having difficulties in the modulation of emotion and as fixedly utilizing cognitive control strategies to avoid their intense emotional experiences, it follows that they may benefit from interventions that enhance their knowledge, acceptance, utilization, and management of emotions.

ERT for GAD integrates components of emotion focused treatments into a cognitive-behavioral framework. In particular, skills training elements related to adaptive regulation of emotions are included in ERT. In addition, emotion-focused techniques from the experiential tradition (see L. S. Greenberg, 2002) are utilized for the purpose of in-session emotion evocation. Some techniques are also drawn from the burgeoning area of emotion-focused brief psychodynamic therapy (see Fosha, 2000; McCullough et al., 2003) and relational interventions (Safran & Muran, 2000). Other integrative approaches to GAD have also been developed and, although they also have experiential components, are more clearly interpersonally-focused (see Newman et al., 2004). Taken together, ERT addresses cognitive factors (e.g., beliefs about threat and security), emotional factors (e.g., avoidance and management of emotional experience) and contextual

factors (e.g., patterns of relating to others and the environment) that may contribute to maladaptive responses.

The goals of ERT are for individuals with GAD to become better able to (1) identify, differentiate, and describe their emotions, even in their most intense form; (2) increase both acceptance of affective experience and ability to adaptively manage emotions when necessary; (3) decrease use of worry and other emotional avoidance strategies; (4) increase ability to utilize emotional information in identifying needs, making decisions, guiding thinking, motivating behavior, and managing interpersonal relationships and other contextual demands. Achievement of these therapeutic goals should equip clients with the ability to effectively increase or decrease their attendance to emotional experience as is necessary to attain desired outcomes, tolerate distress and properly adapt to life's inevitable challenges.

ERT is still currently under development. As such, the treatment will likely be altered from its current form as lessons are learned from its ongoing implementation. Currently, ERT is administered over 20 sessions in a 16-week period. The first 4 weekly sessions (Phase I) focus on psychoeducation about GAD, functional patterns of worry and emotions in past and current situations, and self-monitoring of worry episodes. The following 4 weekly sessions focus on the development of somatic awareness and emotion regulation skills (Phase II). Given their centrality to the approach, the following 8 sessions occur twice-weekly, within a 4-week period. These intensive sessions focus on the application of skills during exposure to emotionally evocative themes (Phase III). The final 4 sessions are conducted weekly. These sessions focus on terminating the therapeutic relationship, relapse prevention, and future goals (Phase IV). Sessions are typically 50 to 60 minutes in length.

Phase 1: Psychoeducation, monitoring, and developmental history

In initial sessions, clients are introduced to the emotion regulation perspective on worry and GAD and to the format of ERT. Early sessions also focus on current worries and patterns of avoidance. Clients are asked about the domains of worry that are most pertinent and the contexts in which these typically arise. The therapist uses the client's anxious experiences to highlight examples of the functional relationship between worry and avoidance of emotion. Clients also begin to examine these episodes through out-of-session self-monitoring (recording thoughts, emotions, physical sensations, and behaviors that arise during the episode) and unstructured writing exercises, which are meant to increase awareness of anxiety-related themes through developing a narrative of these experiences. Both analytic (e.g., Leahy, 2002) and narrative (e.g., Pennebaker, 1997) approaches to writing assignments have been shown to have therapeutic

582 value and can provide different but convergent sources of
583 emotional awareness.

584 In the next few sessions, proposed etiological factors are
585 discussed in terms of the contributing role of both heredit-
586 itary and developmental factors. Clients report as to whether
587 other members have also been anxious. Clients also review
588 the initial onset and developmental history of their worry
589 and anxiety. Individuals with GAD commonly repeat life-
590 long patterns of behavior that reinforce their beliefs in the
591 need to worry and avoid emotional experience. By exam-
592 ining the developmental origins of GAD, clients can gain a
593 better understanding of how they came to have this condition
594 and begin to recognize contributing patterns that they have
595 repeated over time. Also, an implicit goal of these sessions
596 is to build the therapeutic alliance by fostering an empathic
597 connection through a validating stance taken by the therapist
598 in response to the client's expression of life struggles. Allow-
599 ing clients to present their narrative concerning their history
600 with GAD is often crucial given that many clients with GAD
601 feel strong needs to have their therapists hear their "story."
602 The importance of validating emotional experience has been
603 stressed in other approaches such as Linehan's DBT for bor-
604 derline personality disorder (see Linehan, 1993).

605 Developmental factors are discussed in terms of the gen-
606 esis of feelings of insecurity and belief in the need for threat
607 preparedness. Individuals with GAD commonly develop a
608 view of the world as threatening and are often vigilant to
609 challenges to this sense of security. Research has shown that
610 individuals with GAD retrospectively report insecure attach-
611 ment relationships with their primary caregivers and, often,
612 demonstrate similar dysfunctional interpersonal patterns in
613 adulthood (e.g., role-reversed parenting in retrospective re-
614 port and excessively nurturing in adulthood; see Borkovec
615 et al., 2004). In session, discussion explores the maladaptive
616 ways in which clients may have learned to view the world
617 as unsafe and also how they currently seek to address their
618 security needs. In particular, excessive needs for safety often
619 make management of one's emotional life difficult and are
620 typically related to the triggering of worry episodes through-
621 out one's life. The therapist explains how the relationship
622 between safety-seeking behaviors and emotional avoidance
623 could be seen as a vicious circle wherein beliefs about inse-
624 curity and inability to cope can motivate avoidance of dis-
625 tressing emotions and cause emotional messages to become
626 more intense. This intensity could, in turn, lead to the expe-
627 rience of emotion as even more aversive, confirming beliefs
628 about inability to cope, leading to greater attempts to control
629 the emotion with worry, leading the cycle to be repeated.
630 Clients continue to self-monitor outside of session and are
631 asked to pay attention to how their emotional responses lead
632 them into a worry cycle and to take note of any recurrent
633 themes that have arisen as the worry process was engaged
634 (even if the superficial topic of worry constantly shifts).

Fears of alienation, detachment, loss, and failure are common
635 themes. 636

Phase 2: Skills training in somatic awareness and 637 adaptive emotion regulation 638

639 During the skills training phase of ERT, sessions focus on
640 the development of (1) somatic awareness skills to increase
641 flexible awareness of bodily reactions to emotions, (2) cog-
642 nitive skills that involve identification of beliefs about threat
643 and insecurity (including delineation of maladaptive actions
644 taken in service of avoidance, defense, and control), (3) emo-
645 tion skills aimed at increasing understanding of emotional
646 experience and regulation, especially in the face of intense
647 emotional experience, and (4) contextual skills that involve
648 strategies for both getting needs met and regulating emotions
649 as is appropriate for different life domains (e.g., in relation-
650 ships and at work). These sessions included didactic aspects
651 wherein the therapist provides information (verbal and read-
652 ing materials) as to how to achieve these skills but also in-
653 cludes a number of exercises for clients to apply these skills
654 to ongoing issues and conflicts. Further, between sessions,
655 clients are encouraged to practice written and experiential
656 exercises and began applying these skills to their everyday
657 experiences.

658 In the initial sessions of this phase, clients work to in-
659 crease awareness of bodily sensations, gain comfort with
660 these sensations, and allow flexibility in responding to these
661 sensations. This may not be a problem for many individuals
662 with GAD in the abstract but may become more of a problem
663 when they are in an emotionally reactive state characterized
664 by a sense of threat. During these times, individuals with
665 GAD may be less able to understand their emotions and
666 know what has brought them to feel in this particular man-
667 ner. Clients are also encouraged to maintain a focus on their
668 bodies without disengaging or trying to control the experi-
669 ence. Body awareness in psychotherapy has taken a num-
670 ber of forms including mindfulness training (Kabat-Zinn,
671 1990; Linehan, 1993; Segal et al., 2002), focusing (Gendlin,
672 1996), and modified progressive muscle relaxation (PMR;
673 Bernstein, Borkovec, & Hazlett-Stevens, 2000; Roemer &
674 Orsillo, in press); a number of these techniques are used in
675 this phase of ERT. In the case of PMR, the purpose is a depart-
676 ure from the traditional use of PMR, which has often been
677 used to directly decrease the experience of anxiety. In this
678 approach PMR is used to increase awareness and flexibility
679 of muscular responses to perceived threat.

680 As clients learn to attend to physical reactions in a
681 manner that encourages flexibility and discourages avoid-
682 ance, sessions begin to focus more on skill development
683 involving emotional, cognitive, and contextual factors. As
684 discussed above, GAD clients may not have learned the
685 basic emotional skills necessary to adaptively respond to

686 environmental demands. Clients who feel insecure and over-
 687 whelmed by their emotional experience may respond to chal-
 688 lenges with extreme reactions of emotional disinhibition and
 689 overcontrol. Clients learn to identify cues as to when beliefs
 690 about insecurity are typically being activated and examine
 691 how these beliefs affect their ability to function adaptively.
 692 Clients also learn skills to identify, label, and differentiate
 693 among different emotional states. Because of their infor-
 694 mational value, accessing adaptive primary emotions (L. S.
 695 Greenberg, 2002) is essential to positive affective change
 696 and regulation. Clients are given a list of emotions and their
 697 corresponding motivational information (a list adapted from
 698 Lazarus, 1991). Using this list and other aids, clients learn to
 699 identify, label, and differentiate various primary emotional
 700 experiences.

701 During this phase, clients work towards discovering needs
 702 that they consistently find important and determining how
 703 often these needs are met. Clients learn skills for increasing
 704 understanding of how these needs become salient through
 705 different emotional experiences. Skills related to effective
 706 expression of emotional experience are also taught to foster
 707 ability to meet needs in an interpersonal context. Finally,
 708 clients learn skills related to managing their emotional expe-
 709 rience once it feels overwhelming and interruptive. These
 710 skills include those directed at self-soothing through in-
 711 creasing a personal sense of safety and decreasing emo-
 712 tional arousal as well as learning about contextual cues that
 713 help determine when to introspectively deepen attention to
 714 one's emotional experience and when this may be counter-
 715 productive. At the end of this phase, clients are encouraged
 716 to integrate these skills into an adaptive problem-solving
 717 orientation that incorporates emotional, cognitive, and con-
 718 textual sources of information. This stance is similar to what
 719 Linehan (1993) calls the "wise mind" because of its flexible
 720 integration of both rational and emotional factors.

721 Phase 3: Thematic experiential exposure

722 These twice-weekly sessions are the core of ERT. By
 723 this point, clients will have learned the skills of somatic
 724 awareness and emotion regulation. In this phase, in-session
 725 exposure exercises (referred to as "thematic experiential ex-
 726 posure" exercises) are utilized to help clients actively en-
 727 gage emotions, attenuate the anxiety engendered by these
 728 emotions, and to use their increased understanding of their
 729 emotional reactions to inform their needs, goals, and plans
 730 for action. If treatment focused solely on learning new skills
 731 to tolerate and regulate emotions, clients could continue to
 732 avoid aversive emotions by thinking about problems and
 733 needs intellectually without exposing themselves to feared
 734 emotional experiences (and their associated core thematic
 735 meaning) or practicing using the adaptive information these
 736 emotional experiences provide.

737 Thematic experiential exposure exercises are aimed at
 738 raising awareness of emotions, encouraging acceptance of
 739 emotional experience, and fostering regulatory strategies to
 740 generate adaptive courses for action related to core thematic
 741 issues. Each of these exercises is used to induce emotional
 742 arousal, increase understanding about the nature of these
 743 conflicts, and develop adaptive plans of action. The therapist
 744 will also use relational therapeutic techniques (see Safran
 745 & Muran, 2000), such as reflecting the patient's concerns
 746 and monitoring his or her own emotional reactions to the
 747 client to increase the client's understanding of how patterns
 748 of behavior may be reinforced in a given context. By the
 749 end of this phase, clients will have multiple opportunities to
 750 actively test their beliefs about emotional arousal, use their
 751 skills of somatic awareness and emotion regulation to ad-
 752 dress these concerns, and generate new courses of action
 753 based on the integration of cognitive, emotional, and con-
 754 textual sources of information. A number of techniques are
 755 used to help clients experience feared emotional themes.
 756 Interventions range from more experientially-focused exer-
 757 cises aimed at increasing attendance to emotions to both
 758 cognitive-behavioral and affect-focused psychodynamic ex-
 759 ercises aimed at addressing defensive and avoidant behavior.
 760 At the end of this vital phase, clients will use a number of
 761 these exercises to actively test beliefs about insecurity, uti-
 762 lize skills of somatic awareness and emotion regulation to
 763 address these concerns, and generate new courses of action
 764 based on the integration of cognitive, emotional, and contex-
 765 tual sources of information.

766 Since the goal of the experiential exposures is to evoke
 767 emotions related to feared themes, therapists and clients use
 768 interventions that are most appropriate to the client and the
 769 contexts being addressed. Thematic experiential exposures
 770 utilize a number of techniques in order to promote accep-
 771 tance of subjective emotional experience. For instance, emo-
 772 tion evocation techniques such as "chair dialogues" (L. S.
 773 Greenberg, 2002) involve actively engaging conflicts with
 774 representations of significant others (i.e., "empty chair tech-
 775 nique") or between two opposing needs (i.e., "two-chair di-
 776 alogue"). Often core fear experiences are difficult to address
 777 because fear of loss of security is too strong. In this case,
 778 a thematic experiential exposure that could be useful is a
 779 modified two-chair dialogue in which the client would have
 780 a dialogue between the part of herself that strongly needs
 781 security and the part that is motivated towards self-reliance
 782 and exploration in order to gain a more unified approach to
 783 meeting needs (L. S. Greenberg, personal communication).
 784 This could be achieved through a dialogue that encourages
 785 the "catastrophiser" (the part of oneself that is motivated to-
 786 wards always feeling secure) to frighten the less established,
 787 self-reliant self with catastrophic expectations. This is done
 788 to both evoke the core fear in this newer self and to en-
 789 courage this voice, while in this fearful experience, to begin

790 to stand up to the catastrophes by challenging or opposing
791 them.

792 Classic cognitive and behavioral techniques of exposure
793 can also be utilized within an ERT framework. If clients have
794 difficulty attending to their emotional experience or remain
795 in a worried state without engaging emotional experience, a
796 derivative of the “downward arrow” technique (Beck, 1995)
797 can be used. In this technique, the therapist does not try
798 to stop the client from worrying or evoke emotion directly.
799 Rather, the therapist asks the client about the feared con-
800 sequences of the worry. Once these consequences are de-
801 lined, the therapist continues to ask the client about the
802 consequences that she or he fears would arise. This process is
803 continued until the clients’ emotional arousal increases and
804 the client has moved closer to core underlying themes. Other
805 techniques that are commonly used are imagery exercises
806 and role-playing.

807 Experiential exposure exercises occur in the context of the
808 ongoing therapeutic alliance. Clients must feel comfortable
809 confronting these themes without initiating security behav-
810 iors (e.g., worry). The therapist uses the alliance to reflect
811 the client’s concerns and monitor his or her own emotional
812 reactions to the client in order to increase the client’s un-
813 derstanding of how patterns of behavior may be reinforced
814 in a given context. The therapist also aids the client in re-
815 maining in the experiential exposure by utilizing a number
816 of communication tactics including empathic reflection, So-
817 cratic questioning, interpretation, and direct challenging of
818 the client’s verbal statements as well as non-verbal behaviors
819 (e.g., client sighs).

820 Progress review, future goals/relapse prevention,
821 and termination processing

822 In this final phase of ERT, sessions are typically returned to
823 weekly meetings in preparation for termination. Initial goals
824 are reviewed to determine if changes have occurred as well as
825 continuing to address ongoing difficulties. Client and thera-
826 pist discuss how to apply skills and promote emotional accep-
827 tance once therapy is terminated. Discussion often focuses
828 on preventing clients from returning to old coping mecha-
829 nisms (excessive worry and behavioral avoidance) once thera-
830 py was terminated. Client and therapist discuss how skills
831 of emotional understanding and regulation can continue to
832 be utilized in responding to events and making decisions.
833 Ability to tolerate possible future stressful and painful life
834 circumstances is also further explored by reviewing skills
835 and applying them to experiential exposure exercises that
836 center on hypothetical situations related to core themes that
837 may arise in the future. An open discussion of termination
838 and “life after therapy” is also discussed between client and
839 therapist in order to fully address feelings associated with
840 termination and the loss of the therapeutic relationship.

Conclusions

841 Integrative approaches such as ERT might further our ability
842 to treat GAD and other refractory anxiety disorders. A treat-
843 ment that focuses on improving emotion regulation deficits
844 may also help to enhance client’s overall sense of well-being
845 and life quality. However, the efficacy of integrative ap-
846 proaches will need to be empirically evaluated, particularly
847 in comparison to existing interventions. Another important
848 goal of future research in this area will be to study the pro-
849 cess of change in integrative, emotion-focused treatments
850 of anxiety disorders. For instance, it will be important to
851 determine if therapeutic change (i.e., symptom reduction,
852 improvements in functioning and quality of life) occurs as a
853 function of increases in specific emotion regulation abilities.
854 These questions can only be answered through an examina-
855 tion of both treatment outcome and process. In addition, it
856 will also be valuable to determine when and if interventions
857 aimed at changing emotional functioning are warranted.

858 Utilizing an integrative, emotion-focused, approach pro-
859 vides a promising, novel direction for understanding the
860 psychopathology and treatment of GAD and other treatment-
861 resistant anxiety disorders. On a more general level, func-
862 tional viewpoints of emotions appear to be providing a
863 unique bridge between historically divergent areas of clinical
864 psychology. Even 10 years ago, it would be unlikely for clin-
865 icians solidly ensconced in one theoretical viewpoint to have
866 the terminological base or desire to converse with clinicians
867 practicing from a different school of thought. The under-
868 standing of emotions and their management may provide
869 a common language for understanding psychopathological
870 phenomena and treatment process.

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